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In his remarks on my essay "An Economic Perspective on Stare
Decisis,"t Professor Macey offers four major criticisms of my discussion.
First, Professor Macey contends that my characterization of stare decisis
as "judicial adherence to a prior decision known to be wrong" mistak-
enly imputes certainty into an institution grounded in the possibility of
error.2 Second, he believes that the models of stare decisis I offer ignore
both the error-minimization and "public good" aspect of judicial deci-
sionmaking in general and of stare decisis in particular. 3 Third, Macey
argues that the evaluation of the practice of stare decisis requires atten-
tion to legislative power to overrule judicial decisions. 4 Finally, and par-
allel to the third point, Macey suggests that the ability of individuals to
contract around the legal rule should influence our evaluation of stare
decisis.
5
I agree with Professor Macey that a full understanding of stare deci-
sis must set that practice in the context of both legislative and individual
ability to "overrule" the court's decision. I did not attempt a compre-
hensive evaluation of stare decisis in my essay and I cannot hope to pro-
vide an adequate account of the relation of legislative overruling and
private "contracting-around" to stare decisis in the brief time for reflec-
tion and limited space permitted by the Review for reply.6 Macey's dis-
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1. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989)
(appearing in this symposium issue).
2. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 93, 94-95 (1981).
3. Id. at 106-07. I confess to some perplexity at the claim that my analysis ignores error-
minimization as I explicitly discuss "errors of competence" as a possible justification of stare decisis.
4. Id. at 97-98, 110.
5. Id. at 98.
6. Though I think Macey's points important, I do think one should not overestimate their
significance. In many contexts, such as torts between strangers, individuals have no opportunity to
contract around legal rules. In fact, I chose to center much of my discussion around the example of
the pedestrian-and-driver precisely because I could avoid discussion of the ability of parties to con-
tract around the legal rule.
Moreover, even when such an opportunity to contract around the legal rule exists, the difference
between a practice of stare decisis which, in Macey's view, provides certainty and one of no stare
decisis lies solely in some reduction in transaction costs as the parties could specify legal treatment of
their actions under either practice. As the example in section III (A) of Kornhauser suggests, a
policymaker may have non-efficiency reasons for preferring a practice of no stare decisis; these rea-
sons may outweigh the extra transaction costs. Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 68.
Similarly, legislatures, like courts, have limited resources. As a practical matter, then, legisla-
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cussion of his first two points, on the other hand, suggests that my initial
discussion was not sufficiently clear. I hope in this reply to untangle
some confusions that my earlier text apparently engendered.
I. A PRELIMINARY REMARK
Though Macey's comment apparently suggests otherwise, I did not
intend "An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis" as a definitive ap-
praisal of the practice. Rather, I sought largely to characterize precisely
the practice and its justifications. Primarily, I set out a two-dimensional
framework in which to evaluate claims about stare decisis. First, I ar-
ticulated several different models of judicial institutions in which to eval-
uate the practice. Next, I distinguished four classes of error one might
offer to support the practice of stare decisis in each institutional struc-
ture. In this context, the two heuristic models discussed in sections V
and VI and to which Professor Macey devotes much of his discussion
7
are afterthoughts. The model in section V considers "errors" caused by
changes in values in the panel (and perhaps sequential) institutional set-
ting. The model in section VI considers errors resulting from changes in
the world in the context of a unitary (single judge forever) institutional
context. I omitted models of hierarchical courts and of errors in compe-
tence, not because I thought them unimportant, but because I preferred
to illustrate most simply the power of models, and hierarchy and compe-
tence present more complex problems.
The focus on these two narrow models apparently left the impres-
sion that I thought other sources of error in any institutional context (or
the same sources of error in different institutional contexts) could be ig-
tures will not often serve as a speedy and effective corrective to judicial error. Rather, legislatures
will act only when a judicial decision imposes high costs on a well-organized and powerful interest
group or set of interest groups.
7. I am unsure how to understand Professor Macey's extensive discussion of my pedestrian-
and-driver example. Macey, supra note 2, at 96-102. In section VI(B)(3). I argue simply that, in
some instances, a practice of limited stare decisis may be superior to one of no stare decisis or of
strict stare decisis. Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 86. I did not claim that limited stare decisis was
always superior to the other practices. Professor Macey and I thus agree in our conclusion. The
details of Macey's discussion, however, suggest that I failed to make the economic analysis underly-
ing that discussion sufficiently clear. In this note, I attempt to clarify at least some of the misconcep-
tions created by my initial formulation.
To begin, I should have made two assumptions explicit. First, the model makes no assumption
of asymmetric information. The court, the driver, and the pedestrian know at all times which legal
rule would be statically optimal. Moreover, the analysis of the effects of each practice (no stare
decisis, strict stare decisis, limited stare decisis) assumes that all parties know what practice prevails.
Thus, driver and pedestrian know at each instant what legal rule prevails.
Second, both driver and pedestrian are economically rational. This assumption implies that
each actor decides on her activity level on the basis of the costs and benefits to her, given the prevail-
ing legal rule and the judicial practice, of any given choice of activity level.
[Vol. 65:115
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nored. I hoped to argue to the contrary that an evaluation of stare deci-
sis requires careful consideration of each source of error in each
institutional context.
Professor Macey, in his comments, often criticizes the models of sec-
tions V and VI from the perspective of a hierarchical institutional con-
text and with errors resulting from judicial incompetence or uncertainty.
I too believe that these errors and this institutional context may justify in
part stare decisis, but I also believe it worthwhile to model each context/
error combination carefully and precisely in isolation from the others.
II. KNOWLEDGE VS. BELIEF IN PRIOR ERROR
Professor Macey argues that my discussion of stare decisis rests on
the counterfactual assumption that a judge knows that a prior decision
was wrongly decided. Macey then develops three complexes of argument
from this observation: (1) that judicial understanding of their fallibility
will justify stare decisis;8 (2) that this assumption amounts to a commit-
ment to Dworkin's "right answer" thesis;9 and (3) that specialization of
judges may be explained as a response to judicial self-awareness of falli-
bility.10 In this section, I respond briefly to Macey's first and second
arguments. I discuss his third argument in section IV. More specifically,
I argue further that acceptance of the assumption of knowledge does not
commit one to Dworkin's thesis. I agree that the knowledge assumption
is counterfactual but it does not undermine the argument in the way Ma-
cey suggests.
To begin, I shall briefly clarify the sense in which my argument en-
tails a commitment to the claim that every legal question has a right
answer. In the context of my discussion, the objective function of some
(relevant) institutional actor characterizes an answer as "right." It is
then necessary to identify the relevant actor and that actor's objective
function. Implicitly, much of my discussion assumed that each judge's
substantive values identified "right" answers for that judge. I This posi-
tion should be congenial to a legal realist. If Dworkin adheres to this
position, then his economic view of adjudication as "right" in my sense is
8. Macey, supra note 2, at 102-06.
9. Id. at 109.
10. Id. at 102-03, 108.
11. As in my earlier discussion, one must distinguish "right independent of past decisions" and
"right with past decisions taken into account." The discussion in the text and in the prior article
contemplates "a historical right" which must be balanced by substantive concerns mediated through
stare decisis.
At some places in my essay, the objective function of the designer of the court system rather
than of individual judges seems to be indicated. Kornhauser, supra note 1.
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equivalent to "best" (given the judge's "preferences") in the economic
sense.
Consider now Professor Macey's first argument that judges are falli-
ble rather than omniscient. I characterized the judicial state-of-mind as
knowledge rather than (fallible) belief for rhetorical reasons only. Sup-
pose a judge, call her Liza, must decide Instant Case in light of Prior
Case and that she recognizes Instant Case as equivalent to (or governed
by) Prior Case. Liza may have one of three attitudes towards the deci-
sion of Prior Case: 1 2 (i) she may believe (with varying degrees of convic-
tion) that the decision in Prior Case was correct; (ii) she may believe
(with varying degrees of conviction) that the decision in Prior Case was
incorrect; or (iii) she may not have passed judgment on the correctness of
the decision in Prior Case.
My previous discussion does not address possibility (iii). Macey
suggests that this attitude is the appropriate judicial attitude and it would
justify stare decisis on conservation of judicial resources grounds. I shall
discuss this at greater length in section IV when I confront Macey's in-
teresting discussion of specialization. For now let us restrict attention to
attitudes (i) and (ii).
In my discussion of errors of competence, I suggested that certain
forms of judicial fallibility did justify a practice akin to stare decisis, one
in which judges decided unlike cases alike. Moreover, this justification
required a shift in judicial attitude towards adjudication. Jurisprudential
theories of adjudication normally assume that the judge focuses on In-
stant Case; she attempts to decide Instant Case correctly. Judicial in-
competence, I argued, justified stare decisis only if judges shifted their
focus from Instant Case to the class of heterogeneous cases that judges
have difficulty distinguishing in practice from Instant Case. Judges, in
this context, seek to decide the class of cases "well" rather than to decide
Instant Case "correctly." Thus, judicial error may justify stare decisis,
but to do so, it recharacterizes the practice in a manner somewhat at
odds with conventional discussions of stare decisis.
If we maintain the assumption that judges seek to decide Instant
Case correctly, then weakening Liza's conviction from certain knowledge
to probable belief leaves my argument unchanged. Liza may understand
that her judgment that Prior Case was wrongly decided is incorrect; it
12. As my earlier article suggests, Liza actually may find herself in a more complicated situa-
tion if changes in the world have occurred. In this case, she may believe that Prior Case was cor-
rectly decided given the world in Prior Case but that applying the same decision in Instant Case
would yield the wrong outcome. Liza's degree of conviction plays no more important role in the
analysis of this case than in the case discussed in the text. Id.
[Vol. 65:115
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remains, nonetheless, her best judgment about the appropriate resolution
of Prior Case (and Instant Case). To follow Prior Case remains for her,
absent a justification of stare decisis, the wrong decision. Even a skepti-
cal judge, fully aware of her own fallibility, must rely on her best judg-
ment to decide the case before her.
III. THE "PUBLIC GOODS" ASPECT OF ADJUDICATION
Professor Macey maintains that my analysis of stare decisis "departs
dramatically from previous work by economists ... [because it] focuses
exclusively on the value of stare decisis to the litigants in a particular
case, rather than to society as a whole."1 3 Either I misunderstand Ma-
cey's objection or my initial discussion was unclear.
Stare decisis in my analysis has only a public good component. The
public good component appears in two ways. First, actors governed by
primary legal rules look to those rules in making their choices. In the
pedestrian/driver example, the choice of stare decisis over no stare deci-
sis affects the future behavior of pedestrians and drivers precisely because
it affects which primary legal rule will prevail at the time the individuals
act. Second, the "designer" of the judicial practice, like the judges within
the judicial practice, has a social goal that extends beyond the case before
the court. Thus, in the pedestrian/driver example, the designer seeks to
maximize social welfare. In the context of this example, driving and
walking are the only activities open to actors governed by the legal rules.
The welfare-maximizing practice will affect future choices of other driv-
ers and pedestrians; it cannot affect the choices of the parties before the
court. The designer chooses between judicial practices on the basis of
future behavior not out of any concern to resolve a particular dispute
before a court.
Professor Macey may have become confused because he has an-
other, more complex, model of judicial decision as public good in mind.
Suppose actor A has a choice between actions a, and a2 while actor B has
a choice between actions b, and b2. Suppose that each pair (a,b) may
impose some loss on either A or B. A complete legal rule would specify
who bears the (potential) loss for each of the four possible pairs (ai,bj).
Suppose that at the outset, the legal rule is unknown in each of the four
cases. The court then resolves the case (at,bl) under a practice of stare
decisis. Professor Macey may believe that stare decisis has a "public
good" effect on actors who adopt some different pair, say (a, b2). Stare
decisis might have this effect because the equivalence criteria "dictate" a
13. Macey, supra note 2, at 107.
1989]
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particular outcome in the case (a 2,b2) or because the equivalence criteria
merely suggest a particular outcome in this case. Alternatively, the deci-
sion in the case (al,bl) may induce future actors to adopt those actions
because, for all other choices, they face uncertain legal outcomes.
My discussion does not analyze the role of stare decisis in this more
complex model. Rather, my discussion assumed these problems away on
the basis that the criteria identifying equivalent cases were complete,
clear, and well-known to all parties and that the agents faced no choice
among activities in which she might engage. I adopted these assumptions
not because I thought the issues suggested by this complex model unin-
teresting or unimportant but because the issues are complex. Before
these complex problems can be analyzed, we must get clear on the sim-
pler conundrums posed in my essay.
IV. ERROR CORRECTION, SPECIALIZATION AND
OTHER SUNDRY MATTERS
Professor Macey contends that my discussion ignored "error correc-
tion" concerns.' 4 His subsequent discussion offers a potpourri of inter-
esting and provocative remarks on the subject of error correction. In this
section, I focus on two threads in Professor Macey's remarks: (a) spe-
cialization of judges and (b) his distinction between substantive legal
skills and "recognition" skills.
Macey states:
[J]udges apply two sorts of legal skills when deciding a case. One sort
of legal skill is the skill involved in formulating, articulating and apply-
ing substantive legal doctrine to a particular legal dispute. The second
set of legal skills requires the judge to determine what sorts of cases are
alike, in order to 'check' his result in the first case.'
5
This distinction is relatively straightforward and reflects conventional
wisdom within legal practice. Macey argues further, however, that
judges in general are accomplished at recognizing like cases but not gen-
erally accomplished at formulating, articulating, or applying substantive
legal doctrine. Consequently, a practice of stare decisis reduces error be-
cause it allows judges to exercise their talent for recognition and avoid
their failing of substantive pronouncement.'
6
14. 1 find this contention odd as one of my four categories of error, "errors of competence."
deals explicitly with a court's unreliability in arriving at "correct" judgments. Kornhauser, supra
note 1, at 72-73.
15. Macey, supra note 2, at 102. His footnote to this passage equates the first skill with my
characterization of substantive values and the second skill with equivalence criteria or "formal
values."
16. This argument basically rephrases one of the riddles highlighted, I believe, by my discus-
[Vol. 65:115
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This argument has an appealing ring but it requires more to justify
stare decisis. On Macey's account, when Liza confronts a case outside
her expertise, she exercises her recognition skills to arrive at a "correct"
(or at least good) answer. Of course, Liza only recognizes the similarity
in cases; she does not recognize that the prior case was correctly decided.
Thus, if stare decisis reduces error, it does so only because the initial
decisionmaker, having substantive competence, was more likely to get it
right than the average judge.'
7
More problematically, the equivalence criteria have to map onto
substantive decisions in the appropriate fashion. If Liza's skill at recog-
nizing like cases differs from her substantive skills, why should we believe
that the determination that case A is equivalent to case B implies that
both should be decided identically on substantive grounds? If Liza's
equivalence criteria are derived from her substantive values, equivalence
would imply identical substantive outcomes. Professor Macey, however,
cannot rely on the derivative status of recognition skills for his argument
because he believes that judges have superior skill in identifying like cases
than in formulating rules in line with their substantive values. Thus, for
Macey, the equivalence criteria must derive from some other source.
Macey must then explain how the recognition skill sorts cases into sub-
stantively appropriate categories.
Macey's argument concerning skill differences complements his ar-
gument about specialization. I wish to make only two comments here.
First, his argument seems to justify specialized courts at least as much as
stare decisis. If Liza has substantive competence in securities law and
Henry in family law, why create a single court of general jurisdiction on
which both sit rather than two specialized courts on which each has sole
authority?
Second, Professor Macey apparently offers differences in substantive
sion: why don't the criteria which determine when cases are alike derive from the judge's substan-
tive values? If the formal values that determine when like cases are alike derive from the substantive
values, then changes in the world will never induce a court to decide a case wrongly. My discussion
of changes in the world, therefore, assumes a discrepancy between substantive and formal values.
One of Professor Macey's criticisms of my article unwittingly denies this maintained assump-
tion. He describes my notion of stare decisis as "crabbed" because it refers to narrow criteria of
when two cases are alike rather than to meta-criteria. He then offers the meta-rule "maximize social
welfare" as the criterion of similarity. Macey, supra note 2, at 104. This meta-rule, however,
reduces the formal values to the substantive values at issue in the discussion. Stare decisis plays no
role under this meta-rule because changes in the world never lead to wrong decisions. Any meta-
rule that leaves a gap between substantive and formal values, however, creates the possibility of error
regardless of how abstractly we formulate the criterion of similarity or the substantive rule of law.
17. This argument assumes that a substantively incompetent judge confronted with a case of
first impression can manage to resolve it without setting a precedent that other judges must follow.
1989]
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competence as a justification for multi-judge panels.' 8 I find this expla-
nation of adjudication by panels novel and provocative. It also runs
counter to conventional justifications that are grounded in the court as a
collegial body in which deliberation over a decision occurs. The delibera-
tive model sees judges on the panel as peers, each equally competent to
render judgment in the instant case. While the deliberative model may
be counterfactual, one should recall that theories of adjudication are gen-
erally normative.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Rather than respond fully to Professor Macey's provocative com-
ments, I have emphasized the limited ambition of my initial essay. I have
tried to indicate how Professor Macey's concerns reach beyond the sim-
ple distinctions I wished to make to more complex and difficult models of
adjudication. I hoped to decompose the tangled issues of stare decisis
into elements more amenable to analysis and understanding. I then ex-
amined two of the simpler elements of stare decisis. My essay thus
stopped far short of the ideal, in which, after careful study of each ele-
ment, one would reconstruct stare decisis in its full complexity.
I adopted this strategy advisedly. I do not argue that we should
abandon forever the grand ambition of a complete understanding of stare
decisis in particular and our practices of adjudication in general. I con-
tend only that complete understanding will be achieved only after we
have analyzed each of the simple cases carefully. My essay only began
the task; its continuation and completion was left for other occasions and
other hands.
18. Macey, supra note 2, at 108. On this question see generally Kornhauser & Sager. Unpack-
ing the Court, 96 YAI.i: L.J. 82 (1986).
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